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This paper investigates theempirical importance of allowing for multi-dimensional
sources of unobserved heterogeneity in auction models with private information. It in
turn develops the estimation procedure that recovers the distribution of private infor-
mation in the presence of two distinct sources of unobserved heterogeneity. It is shown
that this estimation procedure identiﬁes components of the model and produces uni-
formly consistent estimators of these components. The estimation procedure is applied
to the data from highway procurement. The results of the estimation indicate that
allowing for two-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity may signiﬁcantly aﬀect the re-
sults of estimation as well as policy-relevant instruments derived from the estimated
distributions of bidders’ costs.
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Auctions are extensively used by governments and private organizations as a price-setting
mechanism in markets with private information. However,the performance of a speciﬁc
auction mechanism as well as the choice of the optimal policy instruments (such as reserve
price) depend on the exact distribution of private information in a given auction environ-
ment. Thus,it is important in empirical auction analysis to be able to non-parametrically
identify the distribution of bidders’ private information from the available data.
A large literature on non-parametric identiﬁcation of auction models has emerged to
provide a theoretical foundation for empirical analysis. In a seminal contribution,Guerre,
Perrigne and Vuong (2000) established that the ﬁrst-order condition of bidder optimization
problem can be used to recover the distribution of private information from the distribution
of bids under independent symmetric private values. Subsequent literature extended this
result to settings with aﬃliated private values,asymmetric bidders and settings with risk-
averse bidders. An important assumption underlying this literature is that the researcher
has access to all the common information available to bidders.
When a researcher may not have access to all the common information incorporated
in bidding decisions,the environment is said to feature unobserved auction heterogeneity.
More recently,it has been shown that models with independent private values are iden-
tiﬁed in the presence of unobserved auction heterogeneity. Krasnokutskaya (2009) shows
identiﬁcation and proposes an estimation procedure for the model with an unobserved het-
erogeneity factor that multiplicatively aﬀects bidders’ costs. She shows that accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity has important implications for policy analysis. Hu,McAdams and
Shum (2008) obtain more general identiﬁcation result that allows for a ﬂexible relationship
between the distribution of bidders’ costs and the unobserved heterogeneity factor. These
papers,however,assume that the unobserved heterogeneity factor is one-dimensional and,
therefore,aﬀects the moments of the distribution of bidders’ costs in a coordinated way.
The restriction of unobserved heterogeneity to be one-dimensional is potentially an impor-
tant one. However,the literature provides neither the identiﬁcation results nor estimation
procedure in case of multi-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. Consequently,little is
known about its empirical relevance. This paper attempts to ﬁll this gap in the literature.
In particular,this paper extends the framework in Krasnokutskaya (2009) to allow
for two-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity so that independent factors may aﬀect the
mean and the variance of the distribution of bidders’ costs. I prove that such a model is
identiﬁed from bid data and show how the identiﬁcation argument can be translated into
an estimation procedure that produces uniformly consistent estimators. The latter step
1involves signiﬁcant modiﬁcation of the argument developed in the one-dimensional case.
In the one-dimensional case the consistency argument relies in part on the results from
the classical measurement error literature developed by Li and Vuong (1998). However,
these results require that all the distributions should have bounded support. In the two-
dimensional case the intermediate steps of estimation procedure require working with the
distributions that violate this assumption. Therefore,an independent proof of consistency
has to be developed which exploits restrictions on the tail behavior of the distributions in
question.
I apply the proposed estimation procedure to the data from California highway pro-
curement auctions to investigate the empirical importance of allowing for multi-dimensional
unobserved heterogeneity. The results show that allowing for two-dimensional unobserved
heterogeneity may signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results of estimation as well as the choice of policy
relevant instruments derived from the estimated distributions of bidders’ costs. In particu-
lar,I study the data on auctions for (a) bituminous resurfacing and (b) small construction
projects. I recover the distributions of the private information and the unobserved hetero-
geneity under the two alternative assumptions on the structure of unobserved heterogeneity,
i.e. one- or two-dimensional. In the latter case two non-trivial components of unobserved
heterogeneity are recovered for both sets of projects. However,in the case of bituminous
resurfacing,the distribution of private information remains virtually the same under the
two speciﬁcations. In the case of small construction auctions,the variance of the private
cost component almost doubles when going from the model that allows for one-dimensional
unobserved heterogeneity to the model that allows for two-dimensional heterogeneity. Simi-
larly,I ﬁnd only small diﬀerences in the mark-ups over the bidders’ costs and in the optimal
reserve price computed for the two speciﬁcations in the set of resurfacing projects. In con-
trast,for the set of small construction projects,the model that allows for two-dimensional
heterogeneity recovers mark-ups which are 30% higher then those recovered in the model
that allows for only one-dimensional heterogeneity. Similarly,the optimal reserve price de-
rived from the estimates obtained in the model with two-dimensional heterogeneity results
in a cost of procurement which is 15% lower relative to the costs that arise when the re-
serve price is computed on the basis of the estimates from the model with one-dimensional
heterogeneity. These ﬁnding indicate that allowing for a ﬂexible relationship between the
distribution of bidders’ costs and unobserved heterogeneity may have important implica-
tions for policy variables and have a sizable economic impact.
Hu,McAdams and Shum (2009) provide a very general identiﬁcation result allowing
for a ﬂexible relationship between the the distribution of bidders’ costs and the unobserved
heterogeneity factor in the setting with one-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. They
2introduce an unobserved project heterogeneity as a factor conditional on which bidders’ val-
uations are independent. The authors require that a functional should exist that extracts
the realization of unobserved heterogeneity in a given auction from the auction-speciﬁc dis-
tribution of bids. They show that if such functional exists then the distribution of valuations
conditional on unobserved heterogeneity and the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
are identiﬁed. It seems that their argument may be extended to allow for multi-dimensional
unobserved heterogeneity. However,the estimation strategy based on this identiﬁcation re-
sult has not yet been developed and,therefore,cannot be used to empirically assess the
importance of multi-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity in the data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The remainder of this section discusses
the prior literature. Section 2 describes the model with two-dimensional unobserved het-
erogeneity. Section 3 outlines and proves the identiﬁcation result. Section 4 describes an
estimation algorithm and analyzes statistical properties of the estimation procedure. Sec-
tion 5 describes the market for highway procurement projects and presents results of the
estimation and policy analysis. Section 6 concludes.
1.1 Literature
This paper relates to several strands of the empirical auction literature. The ﬁrst strand
concerns estimation of auction models with private information. These are some of the
most inﬂuencial papers in this literature. Donald and Paarsch (1993,1996) and Laﬀont,
Ossard and Vuong (1995) develop parametric methods to recover the distribution of costs
from the observed distribution of bids. Guerre,Perrigne and Vuong (2000) study identi-
ﬁcation of the ﬁrst price auction model with symmetric bidders and propose a uniformly
consistent estimation procedure. Li,Perrigne and Vuong (2000,2002) extend the result
to the aﬃliated private values and the conditionally independent private values models.
Campo,Perrigne and Vuong (2003) prove identiﬁcation and develop a uniformly consistent
estimation procedure for ﬁrst price auctions with asymmetric bidders and aﬃliated private
values.
The second strand concerns the literature that studies unobserved auction hetero-
geneity. Campo,Perrigne and Vuong (2003) as well as Bajari and Ye (2003) rely on the
assumption that the number of bidders can serve as a suﬃcient statistic for unobserved
auction heterogeneity. Haile,Hong and Shum (2003) appeal to the instrumental variables
approach to control for the variation generated by unobserved factors. Hong and Shum
(2002) account for unobserved auction heterogeneity by modeling the median of the bid
distribution as a normal random variable with a mean that depends on the number of
3bidders. Athey and Haile (2001) study identiﬁcation of auction models with unobserved
auction heterogeneity in the context of second price and English auctions. Chakraborty and
Deltas (1998) assume that the distribution of bidders’ valuations belongs to a two-parameter
distribution family. They use this assumption to derive small sample estimates for the cor-
responding parameters of the auction-speciﬁc valuation distributions. The estimates are
later regressed on observable auction characteristics to determine the percentage of values
variation that is due to unobserved auction heterogeneity. Hu,McAdams and Shum (2009),
Krasnokutskaya (2009),Guerre,Perrigne,Vuong (2009),Roberts (2008) propose alternative
methods to identify auction model with one-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity.
Highway procurement auctions have been extensively studied in the literature. Porter
and Zona (1993) ﬁnd evidence of collusion in Long Island highway procurement auctions.
Hong and Shum (2002) ﬁnd some evidence of common values in bidders’ costs in the case
of New Jersey highway construction auctions. Bajari and Ye (2003) reject the hypothesis
of collusive behavior in procurement auctions conducted in Minnesota,North Dakota and
South Dakota. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) ﬁnd evidence of capacity constraints in
California highway procurement auctions. Bajari and Tadelis (2001) and Bajari,Houghton
and Tadelis (2004) study the implications of the incompleteness of procurement contracts.
Decarolis (2008) studies Italian highway procurement auctions where the average bid is used
to determine the winner.
2M o d e l
This section describes the ﬁrst-price procurement auction model under unobserved auction
heterogeneity and summarizes properties of the equilibrium bidding strategies.
The seller oﬀers a single project for sale to 𝑚 bidders. Bidder 𝑖’s cost is equal to
𝐶𝑖 = 𝑌1 + 𝑌2𝑋𝑖𝑗 (1)
where 𝑌1 and 𝑌2 represent common cost components known to all bidders; 𝑋𝑖 is an individual
cost component and private information of bidder 𝑖. I use capital letters to denote random
variables summarizing the common and individual cost components. The small letters 𝑦1,𝑦 2
and 𝑥 denote realizations of common components and the vector of individual components.
The random variables (𝑌1, 𝑌2, 𝑋) are distributed on their respective supports
𝑆(𝑌1)=[ 𝑦
1,𝑦1], 𝑆(𝑌2)=[ 𝑦
2,𝑦2], 𝑆(𝑋)=[ 𝑥,𝑥]𝑚, 𝑦
2 > 0, 𝑥 > 0,according to the probabil-
ity distribution functions 𝐹𝑌1, 𝐹𝑌2, 𝐹𝑋.
4Asymmetries between bidders: I assume that there are two groups of bidders; 𝑚1
bidders are from group 1, and 𝑚2 bidders, 𝑚2 =( 𝑚 − 𝑚1), are from group 2. Thus,the
vector of independent cost components is given by 𝑋 =( 𝑋11,..,𝑋1𝑚1,𝑋 2(𝑚1+1),..,𝑋2𝑚).
The model and all the results can easily be extended to the case of 𝑚 groups. I focus on
the case of two groups for the sake of expositional clarity. Groups are deﬁned from the
observable characteristics of bidders.
Assumptions (𝐷1) − (𝐷4) are maintained throughout the paper.
(𝐷1) 𝑌1, 𝑌2 and 𝑋𝑗’s are mutually independent.
(𝐷2) The probability density functions of the individual cost components, 𝑓𝑋1 and
𝑓𝑋2, are continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly positive on the interior of [𝑥,𝑥].
(𝐷3) 𝐸𝑌1 =0a n d𝐸𝑋1𝑗 =1 .
(𝐷4)( 𝑎) The number of bidders is common knowledge;1
(𝑏) There is no binding reservation price.
The assumption (𝐷2) ensures the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in
the auction game; (𝐷1)a n d( 𝐷3) provide a basis for the identiﬁcation argument; assump-
tion (𝐷3) is used to ﬁx the locations of the common components; and (𝐷4) summarizes
miscellaneous assumptions about the auction environment.
The auction environment can be described as a collection of auction games indexed
by the diﬀerent values of common components. An auction game corresponding to the
common components values 𝑦1 ∈ [𝑦
1,𝑦1], 𝑦2 ∈ [𝑦
2,𝑦2] is analyzed below.
In this game,the cost realizations of bidder 𝑖 are given by 𝑦1+𝑦2𝑥𝑖, for the realization
of the individual cost component 𝑥𝑖. The bidding strategy of bidder 𝑖 is a real-valued
function deﬁned on [𝑥,𝑥]
𝗽𝑖(.∣𝑦1,𝑦 2): [ 𝑥,𝑥] → [0,∞].
Small Greek letter 𝗽 with subscript 𝑖 is used to denote the strategy of bidder 𝑖 as a
function of the individual cost components and a small Roman letter 𝑏 to denote the value
of this function at a particular realization 𝑥.
Expected proﬁt. The proﬁt realization of bidder 𝑖, 𝜋𝑖(𝑏𝑖,𝑏 −𝑖,𝑥 𝑖∣𝑦1,𝑦 2),equals ( 𝑏𝑖 −
𝑦1 − 𝑦2𝑥𝑖) if bidder 𝑖 wins the project and zero if he loses. The symbol 𝑏𝑖 denotes the bid
submitted by bidder 𝑖, and the symbol 𝑏−𝑖 denotes the vector of bids submitted by bidders
1Note that the model does not assume that the number of bidders is exogenous. All the results in
this paper are valid if the number of bidders is endogenous and depends on the realization of unobserved
heterogeneity. For the details of the model with endogenous participation see Krasnokutskaya and Seim
(2009).
5other than 𝑖. At the time of bidding,bidder 𝑖 knows (𝑦1,𝑦 2)a n d𝑥𝑖 but not 𝑏−𝑖. The bidder
who submits the lowest bid wins the project. The interim expected proﬁt of bidder 𝑖 is
given by
𝐸[𝜋𝑖∣𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑌 𝑙 = 𝑦𝑙]=( 𝑏𝑖 − 𝑦1 − 𝑦2𝑥𝑖)Pr(𝑏𝑖 ≤ 𝑏𝑗,∀𝑗 ∕= 𝑖∣𝑋𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑌 𝑙 = 𝑦𝑙).
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium is then characterized by a vector of functions
𝗽(.∣𝑦1,𝑦 2)={𝗽1(.∣𝑦1,𝑦 2),...,𝗽𝑚(.∣𝑦1,𝑦 2)} such that 𝑏𝑦1,𝑦2;𝑖 = 𝗽𝑖(𝑥𝑖∣𝑦1,𝑦 2) maximizes
𝐸[𝜋𝑖∣𝑋 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑌 𝑙 = 𝑦𝑙], when 𝑏𝑦1,𝑦2;𝑗 = 𝗽𝑗(𝑥𝑗∣𝑦1,𝑦 2),𝑗 ∕= 𝑖, 𝑗 =1 ,..,𝑚;
for every 𝑖 =1 ,..,𝑚 and for every realization of 𝑋𝑖.
McAdams (2003) and others establish that, under assumptions (𝐷1)−(𝐷2), a vector
of equilibrium bidding strategies 𝗽(.∣𝑦1,𝑦 2)={𝗽1(.∣𝑦1,𝑦 2),...,𝗽𝑚(.∣𝑦1,𝑦 2)} exists and is
unique. The strategies are strictly monotone and diﬀerentiable.
Next,I characterize a simple property of the equilibrium bidding strategies.
Proposition 1
If (𝗼1(.),...,𝗼𝑚(.)) is a vector of equilibrium bidding strategies in the game with
𝑦1 =0and 𝑦2 =1 , then the vector of equilibrium bidding strategies in the game with
(𝑦1,𝑦 2), 𝑦𝑙 ∈ [𝑦
𝑙,𝑦𝑙], is given by 𝗽𝑖(.∣𝑦1,𝑦 2)={𝗽1(.∣𝑦1,𝑦 2),...,𝗽𝑚(.∣𝑦1,𝑦 2)}, such that
𝗽𝑖(𝑥𝑖∣𝑦1,𝑦 2)=𝑦1 + 𝑦2𝗼𝑖(𝑥𝑖),𝑖=1 ,...,𝑚.
The proposition shows that the bid function has a factor structure similar to costs
with the individual bid component given by 𝗼𝑖(.). The proof of this proposition is based
on the comparison of two sets of ﬁrst-order conditions and follows immediately from the
assumption that the factor structure of bidders’ costs and the common components are
known to all bidders.
The equilibrium inverse individual bid function for a group “𝑘” bidder is denoted by
𝜉𝑘. Since the function 𝗼𝑘(.) is strictly monotone and diﬀerentiable,the function 𝜉𝑘(.) is well-
deﬁned and diﬀerentiable. The necessary ﬁrst-order conditions for the set of equilibrium
strategies when 𝑦1 =0 ,𝑦 2 =1a r et h e ng i v e nb y
1
𝑎 − 𝜉𝑘(𝑖)(𝑎)










𝑘(.) denotes the derivative of 𝜉𝑘(.).
6Equation (2) characterizes the equilibrium inverse individual bid function when
𝑦1 =0a n d𝑦2 = 1. It describes a trade-oﬀ the bidder faces when choosing a bid: an increase
in the mark-up over the cost may lead to a higher ex-post proﬁt if bidder 𝑖 wins,but it
reduces the probability of winning. The bid 𝑎 is chosen in such a way that the marginal
eﬀects of an inﬁnitesimal change in a bid on the winner’s proﬁt and the probability of
winning sum to zero.
3I d e n t i ﬁ c a t i o n
I assume that the econometrician has access to bid data,based on 𝑛 independent draws
from the joint distribution of (𝑌1,𝑌 2,𝑋). The observable data are in the form {𝑏𝑖𝑗},where
𝑖 denotes the identity of the bidder, 𝑖 =1 ,..,𝑚;a n d𝑗 denotes project, 𝑗 =1 ,...,𝑛.I f
data represent equilibrium outcomes of the model with two-dimensional unobserved auction
heterogeneity,then
𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 𝗽𝑘(𝑖)(𝑥𝑖𝑗∣𝑦1𝑗,𝑦 2𝑗)( 3 )
(i.e., 𝑏𝑖𝑗 is a value of bidder 𝑖’s equilibrium bidding strategy corresponding to (𝑦1𝑗,𝑦 2𝑗)
evaluated at the point 𝑥𝑖𝑗).
Iu s e𝐵𝑖 to denote the random variable that describes the bid of bidder 𝑖 of group
𝑘(𝑖) with distribution function 𝐺𝐵𝑘(𝑖) and the associated probability density function 𝑔𝐵𝑘(𝑖);
𝑏𝑖𝑗 denotes the realization of this variable in auction 𝑗. The econometrician observes the
joint distribution function of (𝐵𝑖1,..,𝐵𝑖𝑙) for all subsets (𝑖1,...,𝑖𝑙)o f( 1 ,...,𝑚)2.
As was shown in the previous section, 𝑏𝑖𝑗 depends on the realizations of the com-
mon and individual cost components as well as on the distributions of the individual cost
components. This section examines under what conditions on available data there exists a
unique tuple {{𝑥𝑖𝑗},𝐹 𝑌1,𝐹 𝑌2,𝐹 𝑋} that satisﬁes (3),i.e.,under what conditions the model
from a previous section is identiﬁed.
Proposition 1 establishes that
𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 𝑦1𝑗 + 𝑦2𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑗,
where 𝑎𝑖𝑗 is a hypothetical bid that would have been submitted by bidder 𝑖 if 𝑦1 were equal
to zero and 𝑦2 were equal to one. I use 𝐴𝑖 to denote the random variable with realizations
equal to 𝑎𝑖𝑗. The associated distribution function is denoted by 𝐺𝐴𝑘(𝑖) with the probability
density function 𝑔𝐴𝑘(𝑖). Notice that the econometrician does not observe (𝑦1𝑗,𝑦 2𝑗)a n d
2In fact, it is not necessary to observe joint distribution for all subsets. For details, see the formulation
of Theorem 1.
7neither therefore 𝑎𝑖𝑗. The distribution of 𝐴𝑖 is latent.
The following theorem is the main result of this section. It formulates suﬃcient
identiﬁcation conditions for the model with two dimensional unobserved heterogeneity.
Theorem 1
If conditions (𝐷1)−(𝐷4) are satisﬁed, then the probability density functions 𝑓𝑌1,𝑓 𝑌2
are uniquely identiﬁed from the joint distribution of four arbitrary bids (𝐵𝑖1,𝐵 𝑖2,𝐵 𝑖3,𝐵 𝑖4).
The probability density functions 𝑓𝑋𝑗,𝑗=1 ,2, are also uniquely identiﬁed from the joint
distribution of four arbitrary bids (𝐵𝑖1,𝐵 𝑖2,𝐵 𝑖3,𝐵 𝑖4) if 𝑘(𝑖𝑙)=𝑗 for some 𝑙 =1 ,...,4. 3.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on a statistical result by Kotlarski (1966),4 which es-
tablishes that the marginal distributions of mutually independent random variables (𝑍1,𝑍 2,𝑍 3)
are identiﬁed from the joint distribution of random variables (𝑊1,𝑊 2) such that
𝑊1 = 𝑍1 + 𝑍3,𝑊 2 = 𝑍1 + 𝑍3.
This result requires that the characteristic functions of 𝑍1,𝑍 2,𝑍 3 should be non-vanishing.
Under these conditions it is possible to solve for the characteristic functions of 𝑍′
𝑖𝑠 from the
joint characteristic function of (𝑊1,𝑊 2). More speciﬁcally,let Ψ( .,.)a n dΨ 1(.,.)d e n o t e
the joint characteristic function of (𝑊1,𝑊 2) and the partial derivative of this characteristic
function with respect to the ﬁrst component respectively. Also,let Φ 𝑍𝑖(.) denote character-
istic functions of 𝑍′
𝑖𝑠 . Then,














Once characteristic functions of 𝑍1,𝑍 2,𝑍 3 are known the probability density functions of
𝑍′
𝑖𝑠 can be recovered using inverse Fourier transformation. In fact,since there is a one-to-
one distribution between characteristic and density functions,the distribution of random
variable is identiﬁed if the characteristic function of this distribution can be recovered.




Lemma 1 (see Appendix) establishes that all the random variables considered in
this proof have non-vanishing characteristic functions. The rest of the proof is organized in
3s t e p s .
Step 1
First,I form the pair-wise bid diﬀerences for two pairs of distinct bids:
𝑊𝑖1,𝑖2 = 𝐵𝑖1 − 𝐵𝑖2 and 𝑊𝑖3,𝑖4 = 𝐵𝑖3 − 𝐵𝑖4. The identiﬁcation of the probability density
function 𝑓𝑌2 is established by applying Kotlarski’s argument to the joint distribution of
(log𝑊𝑖1,𝑖2, log𝑊𝑖3,𝑖4) conditional on (𝑊𝑖1,𝑖2 > 0,𝑊 𝑖3,𝑖4 > 0). The later condition is equiv-
alent to (𝐴𝑖1 − 𝐴𝑖2 > 0,𝐴 𝑖3 − 𝐴𝑖4 > 0). Since there is no special rule according to
which indexes (𝑖1,𝑖 2,𝑖 3,𝑖 4) are ﬁxed,then log( 𝐴𝑖1 − 𝐴𝑖2)a n dl o g ( 𝐴𝑖3 − 𝐴𝑖4) conditional
on (𝐴𝑖1 − 𝐴𝑖2 > 0,𝐴 𝑖3 − 𝐴𝑖4 > 0) are independent of each other and of log(𝑌2). There-
fore,conditions of Kotlarski’s theorem are satisﬁed. At this point I impose normalization
𝐸[log(𝑌2)] = 0. I will re-adjust recovered distributions later so as to satisfy condition (𝐷3).
Step 2
(a) The joint characteristic function of 𝑊𝑖1,𝑖3 and 𝑊𝑖2,𝑖3 conditional on
𝑊𝑖1,𝑖3 > 0,𝑊 𝑖2,𝑖3 > 0 together with the characteristic function of 𝑌2 (identiﬁed in (a))
identiﬁes the joint characteristic functions and therefore joint distributions of
(𝐴𝑖1 −𝐴𝑖3,𝐴 𝑖2 −𝐴𝑖3) conditional on (𝐴𝑖1 −𝐴𝑖3 > 0,𝐴 𝑖2 −𝐴𝑖3 > 0). The joint distributions
of (𝐴𝑖1 − 𝐴𝑖3,𝐴 𝑖2 − 𝐴𝑖3) conditional on (𝐴𝑖1 − 𝐴𝑖3 > 0,𝐴 𝑖2 − 𝐴𝑖3 < 0),
(𝐴𝑖1−𝐴𝑖3 < 0,𝐴 𝑖2−𝐴𝑖3 > 0),( 𝐴𝑖1−𝐴𝑖3 < 0,𝐴 𝑖2−𝐴𝑖3 < 0) are identiﬁed in a similar way.
The probabilities of observing (𝐴𝑖1−𝐴𝑖3 > 0,𝐴 𝑖2−𝐴𝑖3 > 0), (𝐴𝑖1−𝐴𝑖3 > 0,𝐴 𝑖2−𝐴𝑖3 < 0),
(𝐴𝑖1 − 𝐴𝑖3 < 0,𝐴 𝑖2 − 𝐴𝑖3 > 0) or (𝐴𝑖1 − 𝐴𝑖3 < 0,𝐴 𝑖2 − 𝐴𝑖3 < 0) are identiﬁed from the
data. Therefore,the joint distribution of ( 𝐴𝑖1 − 𝐴𝑖3,𝐴 𝑖2 − 𝐴𝑖3) is also identiﬁed.
(b)The Kotlarski argument,then,is applied to the joint distribution of
(𝐴𝑖1 −𝐴𝑖3,𝐴 𝑖2 −𝐴𝑖3) to identify the probability density functions of 𝐴𝑖1, 𝐴𝑖2 and 𝐴𝑖3 under
normalization that 𝐸[𝐴𝑖1]=0 .
(c) The argument developed in Laﬀont and Vuong (1996) and used in Krasnokut-
skaya (2009) establishes identiﬁcation of the probability density functions of 𝑋𝑖1,𝑋 𝑖2,𝑋 𝑖3
from the probability distributions of 𝐴𝑖1, 𝐴𝑖2 and 𝐴𝑖3.
(d) Let 𝑒𝑌2 and 𝑒𝑋1 denote the expectations of 𝑌2 and 𝑋1 under above normalization,
then the random variables ˜ 𝑌2 = 𝑌2
𝑒𝑌 , ˜ 𝑋1 = 𝑒𝑌 𝑋1 − 𝑒𝑌 𝑒𝑋1 +1a n d ˜ 𝑋2 = 𝑒𝑌 𝑋2 − 𝑒𝑌 𝑒𝑋1 +1
represent components of the model that corresponds to the normalization postulated in
(𝐷3).
9Step 3
The probability density functions 𝑔𝐴𝑖1, 𝑓𝑌2 uniquely determine the probability dis-
tribution and thus the characteristic function of 𝑌2 ⋅𝐴𝑖1,which allows unique identiﬁcation
of the probability distribution of 𝑌1 from the characteristic function of 𝐵𝑖1. End of proof.
Thus, 𝑓𝑌1, 𝑓𝑌2, 𝑓𝑋1, 𝑓𝑋2 are identiﬁed from the joint distribution of four arbitrary
bids. Similar to the one-dimensional case,the exact realizations of 𝑦1𝑗, 𝑦2𝑗 and {𝑥𝑖𝑗} are
not uniquely identiﬁed.
4 Estimation
The econometrician has data for 𝑛 auctions. For each auction 𝑗, (𝑚𝑗,{𝑏𝑖𝑗}
𝑖=𝑚𝑗
𝑖=1 ,𝑧 𝑗)a r e
observed,where 𝑚𝑗 is the number of bidders in the auction 𝑗,with 𝑚𝑗1 bidders of group 1
and 𝑚𝑗2 bidders of group 2; {𝑏𝑖𝑗}
𝑖=𝑚𝑗
𝑖=1 is a vector of bids submitted in the auction 𝑗;a n d
𝑧𝑗 is a vector of auction characteristics.
In the estimation procedure which follows the observable covariates could be handled
in two ways. An index assumption could be made,i.e. 𝑐𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜎𝑗(𝑦1𝑗 + 𝑦2𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑗)w h e r e
𝜇𝑗 = 𝑧𝑗𝗼 and 𝜎𝑗 = 𝑧𝑗𝗾. From Proposition 1 it follows that 𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 𝜇𝑗 +𝜎𝑗(𝑦1𝑗 +𝑦2𝑗𝑏0
𝑖𝑗). Then,
in the ﬁrst step the indices 𝜇𝑗 and 𝜎𝑗 are estimated conditional on the number of bidders
and normalized bids are formed: 𝑏0
𝑖𝑗 =( 𝑏𝑖𝑗 − 𝜇𝑗)/𝜎𝑗. The remaining steps of estimation
procedure are applied to the normalized bids. I follow this procedure in the empirical part
of this paper. Alternatively,the estimation steps below could be implemented conditional
on the observable project characteristics. More speciﬁcally,the researcher should condition
on discrete attributes and use kernel smoothing over the continuous attributes.
The steps of the estimation procedure closely follow the steps of identiﬁcation ar-
gument. I assume that at least four bids,( 𝐵𝑖1,𝐵 𝑖2,𝐵 𝑖3,𝐵 𝑖4) are available per project. For
the convenience of exposition it is assumed that index 𝑖1 corresponds to the bids submitted
by the bidders from the group 1 whereas all other bids are submitted by the bidders from
the group 2. It is straightforward to adjust the steps of estimation procedure if the conﬁg-
uration of bidder set is diﬀerent. Finally,I use Δ 𝑘,𝑙𝑋 to denote the diﬀerence between the
observations of variable 𝑋 subscripted 𝑖𝑘 and 𝑖𝑙,i.e. Δ 𝑘,𝑙𝑋 = 𝑋𝑖𝑘 − 𝑋𝑖𝑙; 𝐿Δ𝑘,𝑙𝑋 denotes
logarithm of Δ𝑘𝑙𝑋.
Step 1
1. First,the researcher selects a subsample such that ( 𝐵𝑖1 − 𝐵𝑖2) > 0, (𝐵𝑖3 − 𝐵𝑖4) > 0.
Let us denote the number of projects in this subsample by 𝑛01. This subsample is







exp(𝑖𝑡1 log(𝐵𝑖1 − 𝐵𝑖2)+𝑖𝑡2 log(𝐵𝑖3 − 𝐵𝑖4))







The researcher should average over all possible quadruples to enhance eﬃciency. If
bidders are symmetric,the eﬃciency could be further improved by using
(−(𝐵𝑖1 − 𝐵𝑖2), −(𝐵𝑖3 − 𝐵𝑖4)) for 𝐵𝑖1 − 𝐵𝑖2 < 0,𝐵 𝑖3 − 𝐵𝑖4 < 0.
2. The characteristic function of log(𝑌2) is estimated as





𝑑𝑢2 − 𝑖𝑡𝐸[log(𝐵𝑖1 − 𝐵𝑖2)]).
Here I adopt normalization 𝐸[log(𝑌2)] = 0. As in the identiﬁcation argument the
researcher would re-normalize all the variables in the later steps.







for 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆(log𝑌2), where 𝑇 is a smoothing parameter.




for 𝑦 ∈ 𝑆(𝑌2).
Step 2
1. I use ˆ 𝜑𝐿𝑌2(𝑡) to estimate the joint characteristic function of
(log(𝐴𝑖1−𝐴𝑖3), log(𝐴𝑖2−𝐴𝑖3)) from the subsample with (𝐵𝑖1−𝐵𝑖3 > 0,𝐵 𝑖2−𝐵𝑖3 > 0)
11and,therefore,( 𝐴𝑖1 − 𝐴𝑖3 > 0,𝐴 𝑖1 − 𝐴𝑖3 > 0)
ˆ 𝜑𝐿(Δ1,3𝐴),𝐿(Δ2,3𝐴)(𝑡1,𝑡 2)=
ˆ Ψ(𝐿(Δ1,2𝐵),𝐿(Δ3,4𝐵))(𝑡1,𝑡 2)
ˆ 𝜑𝐿𝑌2(𝑡1 + 𝑡2)
.
Similarly,I obtain





















exp(−𝑖𝑡1𝑢1 − 𝑖𝑡2𝑢2)ˆ 𝜑𝐿(Δ1,3𝐴),𝐿(Δ2,3𝐴)(𝑡1,𝑡 2)𝑑𝑡










exp(−𝑖𝑡1𝑢1 − 𝑖𝑡2𝑢2)ˆ 𝜑𝐿(−Δ1,3𝐴),𝐿(−Δ2,3𝐴)(𝑡1,𝑡 2)𝑑𝑡










exp(−𝑖𝑡1𝑢1 − 𝑖𝑡2𝑢2)ˆ 𝜑𝐿(−Δ1,3𝐴),𝐿(Δ2,3𝐴)(𝑡1,𝑡 2)𝑑𝑡










exp(−𝑖𝑡1𝑢1 − 𝑖𝑡2𝑢2)ˆ 𝜑𝐿(Δ1,3𝐴),𝐿(−Δ2,3𝐴)(𝑡1,𝑡 2)𝑑𝑡





































conditional on(Δ1,3𝐴>0,Δ2,3𝐴<0), for 𝑢1 ∈ 𝑆(𝐿Δ1,3𝐴∣Δ1,3𝐴>0),
𝑢2 ∈ 𝑆(𝐿(−Δ2,3𝐴)∣Δ2,3𝐴<0).
4. I use frequency estimators5
























to obtain the probability density function of the unconditional distribution of
5Here 𝑛02 is the number of projects with (Δ1,3𝐵<0, Δ2,3𝐵<0), 𝑛03 is the number of projects with
(Δ1,3𝐵<0, Δ2,3𝐵>0), 𝑛04 is the number of projects with (Δ1,3𝐵>0, Δ2,3𝐵<0).
13(𝐴𝑖1 − 𝐴𝑖3,𝐴 𝑖2 − 𝐴𝑖3):
˜ 𝑓Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴(𝑢1,𝑢 2)= ˜ 𝑓
(1)
Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴(𝑢1,𝑢 2) ˆ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(Δ1,3𝐵>0, Δ2,3𝐵>0) +
˜ 𝑓
(2)
−Δ1,3𝐴,−Δ2,3𝐴(−𝑢1,−𝑢2) ˆ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(Δ1,3𝐵<0, Δ2,3𝐵<0) +
˜ 𝑓
(3)
−Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴(−𝑢1,𝑢 2) ˆ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(Δ1,3𝐵<0, Δ2,3𝐵>0) +
˜ 𝑓
(4)
Δ1,3𝐴,−Δ2,3𝐴(𝑢1,−𝑢2) ˆ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(Δ1,3𝐵>0, Δ2,3𝐵<0).
5. This allows us to construct
ˆ ΦΔ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2)=
∫∫
exp(𝑖𝑡1𝑢1 + 𝑖𝑡2𝑢2) ˜ 𝑓Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴(𝑢1,𝑢 2)𝑑𝑢1 𝑑𝑢2
ˆ Φ1,Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2)=
∫∫
𝑖𝑢1 exp(𝑖𝑡1𝑢1 + 𝑖𝑡2𝑢2) ˜ 𝑓Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴(𝑢1,𝑢 2)𝑑𝑢1 𝑑𝑢2.
6. The characteristic functions of the individual bid components 𝐴𝑖𝑘,𝑘=1 ,3,are esti-
mated as









for 𝑘 =1 ,2.
Here I use normalization that 𝐸[𝐴𝑖3] = 0. I re-normalize all the variables in the later
steps.







8. The individual inverse bid function at a point 𝑎 ∈ 𝑆(𝐴𝑘) is estimated as
ˆ 𝜉𝑘,𝑛(𝑎)=𝑎 −
(1 − ˜ 𝐹𝐴1,𝑛(𝑎)) ⋅ (1 − ˜ 𝐹𝐴2,𝑛(𝑎))






and ˆ 𝑎𝑛 is an estimate of the lower bound of the support of 𝑓𝐴𝑘(.), which corresponds to
the normalizations 𝐸[log𝑌2]=0a n d𝐸[𝐴𝑖3] = 0 (see the Appendix for the discussion
of the support estimation).
9. Here the re-normalization should be performed as described in step 2 of the identiﬁ-
cation argument.
Step 3
































5 Properties of the Estimators
The estimation procedure yields uniformly consistent estimators of the relevant distribu-
tions. This result is derived under the following restrictions on the tail behavior of charac-
teristic functions.
15(𝐷5) The characteristic functions 𝜑𝐿𝑌2, 𝜑𝑌1, 𝜑𝐿𝐴𝑘, 𝜑𝐴𝑘 and 𝜑𝑌2𝐴𝑘 are ordinary-
smooth.6
This property holds,for example,when cumulative probability functions of cost
components admit up to 𝑅, 𝑅 > 1 continuous derivatives on the support interior such that
𝑀 of them,1 ≤ 𝑀 ≤ 𝑅,can be continuously extended to the real line.
Theorem 2 summarizes properties of the estimator.
Theorem 2
If conditions (𝐷1)−(𝐷5) are satisﬁed, then ˆ 𝑓𝑌1, ˆ 𝑓𝑌2 and ˆ 𝑓𝑋𝑘 are uniformly consistent
estimators of 𝑓𝑌1, 𝑓𝑌2 and 𝑓𝑋𝑘, 𝑘 =1 ,2, respectively.
Notice that in this setting I cannot directly apply results obtained in Li and Vuong
(1998) on the uniform consistency of the estimators derived from the Kotlarski’s theorem.
This is because their results require that all the random variables involved have bounded
support. This property does not hold in this setting. The random variables 𝐴𝑖𝑘, 𝑘 =1 ,..,3,
have the same support. As a result the support of (𝐴𝑖𝑘 −𝐴𝑖𝑙) contains zero and the support
of log(𝐴𝑖𝑘 − 𝐴𝑖𝑙) conditional on 𝐴𝑖𝑘 − 𝐴𝑖𝑙 > 0i sg i v e nb y( −∞,𝑀]f o rs o m e𝑀>0. In
order to derive the uniform convergence of estimators in the case with unbounded support
I will exploit the tail behavior of log(𝐴𝑖𝑘 − 𝐴𝑖𝑙) which is established in Lemma 3 (in the
Appendix).
6 Application
I apply the methodology presented in Section 4 to data from highway procurement auctions.
I use data provided by the California Department of Transportation (CalTrans),which
is responsible for construction and maintenance of roads and highways within California.
CalTrans allocates the work which needs to be done to companies in the form of projects
through a ﬁrst price sealed bid auction. The project usually involves a small number of
tasks,such as resurfacing or replacing the base or ﬁlling in cracks.
Projects are advertised four weeks prior to the letting date. Companies interested
in the project can obtain a detailed description from CalTrans. CalTrans constructs a cost
estimate for every project. This estimate is based on the engineer’s assessment of the work
required to perform each task and prices derived from the winning bids for similar projects
let in the past. The costs are then adjusted through a price deﬂator. The reserve price,
6Following Fan (1991): The distribution of random variable 𝑍 is ordinary-smooth of order ϰ if its
characteristic function Φ𝑧(𝑡)s a t i s ﬁ e s𝑑0∣𝑡∣
−ϰ ≤∣ Φ𝑧(𝑡)∣≤𝑑1∣𝑡∣
−ϰ as t→∞for some positive constants
𝑑0,𝑑1,ϰ.with ϰ > 1.
16while formally present,is not enforced.
It is unclear if the auction participants have a good idea about the number of
their competitors. The existing literature on highway procurement auctions tends to argue
that this is a small market where participants are well informed about each other and can
accurately predict the identities of auction participants.7 I follow this tradition and assume
that the number of actual bidders is known to auction participants.
I allow for cost asymmetries between bidders. In particular,I distinguish between
two types of bidders: regular (large) bidders and fringe bidders. The set of regular bidders
is deﬁned to include companies that consistently won at least $10 million in projects during
each year in my data set and have at least 100 employees.
The analysis focuses on two types of projects: (1) bituminous resurfacing and (2)
small construction projects. The projects in the ﬁrst set involve stripping the old surface
oﬀ,correcting the road base and laying out new surface. These projects are quite similar
and well deﬁned. After I control for the size of the project,time allocated,location and
type of road,the remaining variation (not observed in the data) is associated with possible
curvature,incline or elevation of the road,ground conditions,etc. In comparison,small
construction projects usually involve building small parking lots,culverts and small bridges.
The projects in this set are less homogeneous and may have substantial amount of project-
speciﬁc variation which is diﬃcult to summarize in the data. Such projects usually involve
excavation,levering the ground,laying the base,building a stand alone structure,etc. They
are much simpler than projects in the construction category because they involve building
simple objects according to known and well-deﬁned blueprints. The completion of such
project does not require a lot of time and therefore is not associated with long-run risks,
planning and commitments.
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the two sets of projects. I focus on the
medium-size projects in both categories so that engineer’s estimates are similar across the
two sets. The small construction projects are allowed longer duration (on average 25%
longer than the duration of resurfacing projects) and tend to have a higher number of
tasks.
Table 2 reports the estimates from the OLS regression of the logs of the bids on
the project characteristics for the two sets of projects used in the estimation. The results
indicate that observable characteristics explain a higher portion of variation in log-bids in
the case of bituminous resurfacing. In additional,the engineer’s estimate plays a more
important role in the case of bituminous resurfacing. This indicates that this measurement
7See, for example, Bajari and Ye (2003).
17Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variables Bituminous Small
Resurfacing Construction
Engineer’s estimate 6.05 6.0
(hundreds of thousands) (1.6) (1.2)




[𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟,𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒] [4,0] [4,0]
Number of projects 252 270
Note: The standard deviations are shown in the parenthesis.
is more precise for resurfacing projects.











Other controls: year,month and district dummy variables.
𝑅2 0.91 0.82
Note: The standard errors are shown in the parenthesis.
To account for the observable project characteristics I assume that
log(𝑏𝑖𝑗)=𝑥𝑗𝗽 +l o g𝑦 +l o g˜ 𝑏𝑖𝑗
for the speciﬁcation with one-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity and
log(𝑏𝑖𝑗)=𝑥𝑗𝗽 +l o g ( 𝑦1 + 𝑦2˜ 𝑏𝑖𝑗)
for the speciﬁcation with two-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. That is,I extract
observable project variation by using OLS projection of bids on observable project charac-
18teristics and use residuals from this regression in further estimation.
Figures 1 and 2 depict the estimated densities of the costs components under one-
and two-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity,and for the two sets of projects. Table 2
summarizes the results of the estimation. For both groups of projects the estimation under
the assumption of two-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity recovers three non-trivial cost
components. In both cases,the variance of the scaling component ( 𝑌2) is smaller under
two-dimensional speciﬁcation relative to one-dimensional speciﬁcation. The variance of the
distribution of the individual cost component is very similar across speciﬁcations in the
case of bituminous resurfacing and increases substantially in the case of small construction
projects. Similarly,the estimated markups over the bidders’ costs diﬀer very little across
speciﬁcations in the case of resurfacing projects whereas they increase from 7% (under one-
dimensional speciﬁcation) to 9.3% (under two-dimensional speciﬁcation) in the case of small
construction projects.
The results of estimation,thus,underscore the potential for misspeciﬁcation bias.
The model with two-dimensional heterogeneity mitigates the bias by allowing for greater
ﬂexibility in estimation.
Figure 1: Bituminous Resurfacing









































Note: The top panel shows the estimated densities of the unobserved auction heterogeneity components.
The lower panel reports the estimated density of bidder private information. The solid line corresponds to
the case of one-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity while the line with a cross-marker depicts the density
estimated under two-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. Dotted lines represent 5% - 95% quantiles of
pointwise density estimators.
19Figure 2: Small Construction Projects








































Note: The top panel shows the estimated densities of the unobserved auction heterogeneity components.
The lower panel reports the estimated density of bidder private information. The solid line corresponds to
the case of one-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity while the line with a cross-marker depicts the density
estimated under two-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. Dotted lines represent 5% - 95% quantiles of
pointwise density estimators.
Further,I study the importance of allowing for greater ﬂexibility in the speciﬁcation
of the model with unobserved heterogeneity by comparing the optimal reserve price derived
from the estimates obtained under the assumption of (a) one-dimensional and (b) two-
dimensional unobserved heterogeneity.
The government chooses a reserve price to minimize the expected cost of procure-
ment,which consists of two parts: the expected cost of not allocating the job today and
the expected cost of completing the work today given the reserve price 𝑟. Let us denote
the ﬁrst component 𝑐0. It represents the sum of the cost of waiting another period and
the expected cost at which the project can be completed in the future. Then the objective
function of the government is therefore given by




I do not have data on the magnitude of 𝑐0. Therefore,I use a plausible value for 𝑐0
and derive an optimal reserve price for this value.
20Table 3: Estimation Results
























avrg. mark-up 5.7% 7.8%
[5.3,6.4] [7.2,8.3]
Note: The 5% - 95% quantiles of the estimators are shown in the parenthesis.
21The results of the analysis are summarized in the Table 4. The table records for
every case (1) the reserve price,(2) the probability with which a bid is submitted and (3)
the cost of procurement as a percent of 𝑐0.
For each speciﬁcation I consider two cases: (a) realization of unobserved heterogene-
ity is known to the government with the cost to the government given by




(b) realization of unobserved heterogeneity is unknown to the government and the reserve
price is derived to minimize the average cost of procurement,where the average is taken
with respect to the distribution of unobserved auction heterogeneity,i.e.
𝐶 =
∫
(𝑐0 Pr(𝑏𝑖𝑗 >𝑟 , 𝑖=1 ,...,𝑛∣𝑦)+
𝑟 ∫
𝑏
𝑏𝑛(1 − 𝐹𝐵(𝑏∣𝑦))𝑛−1𝑓𝐵(𝑏∣𝑦)𝑑𝑏) 𝑓𝑌 (𝑦)𝑑𝑦.
For the case in (a) Table 4 reports (1) the average reserve price,(2) the average probability
with which a bid is submitted and (3) the average cost of procurement as a percent of 𝑐0.
The average is taken with respect to the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
I consider both (a) and (b) cases because the case (a) may not be implementable in
practice if the government does not know the realization of unobserved auction heterogene-
ity. In this case the reserve price derived in (b) can be used.
The table shows that in the set of small construction projects the reserve price
based on the distributions estimated under the assumption of two-dimensional unobserved
heterogeneity is higher than the reserve price based on the distributions estimated under
the assumption of one-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. It also results in higher par-
ticipation and lower cost of procurement. The table does not record signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between one- and two-dimensional cases in the case of bituminous resurfacing.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper analyzes the ﬁrst price auction model with two-dimensional unobserved auction
heterogeneity. I show that such a model is identiﬁed from the bid data,and develop an
estimation methodology to recover the distribution of bidders’ private information and
the distributions of two-dimensional unobserved auction heterogeneity. I show that this















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































23I apply this methodology to the sets of projects associated with bituminous resur-
facing and small structures. I ﬁnd that while in the case of bituminous resurfacing projects
the estimated distribution of the private information diﬀers little across speciﬁcations,in
the case of small structure projects,allowing for two-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity
results in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent estimates.
I also show that accounting for the two-dimensional nature of unobserved hetero-
geneity has important implications for the computation of optimal reserve prices. In partic-
ular,I ﬁnd that in the set of small construction projects where two distinct dimensions of
unobserved heterogeneity are present,the optimal reserve price is higher and calls for higher
participation compared to the reserve price derived from the estimates obtained under the
assumption of one-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. I also ﬁnd that the reserve price
based on estimates from the misspeciﬁed model results in procurement costs which are 15%
higher than the procurement costs under optimal reserve price.
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The characteristic function of the variable 𝑋 is non-vanishing if for every 𝑇>0
there exists 𝑡 such that ∣𝑡∣ >𝑇 and 𝜑𝑋(𝑡) ∕=0 .
Lemma 1
Let 𝑌 and 𝐴 denote random variables with bounded supports [𝑦, 𝑦] and (𝑎, 𝑎] such
that 𝑦 > 0,𝑎=0 . Then, the characteristic functions of (a) 𝑌 and (b) log𝐴 are non-
vanishing.
Proof
(a) The non-vanishing property of the characteristic function of 𝑌 is established as
in Krasnokutskaya (2009). The proof introduces a function which is an extension of the
characteristic function to the complex plane. It is shown that such a function is inﬁnitely
diﬀerentiable everywhere in the complex plane. It,therefore,is an entire function. Thus,
the number of points where 𝜑𝑌 (𝑡) is equal to zero cannot be more than countable,which
means that 𝜑𝑌 (𝑡) is non-vanishing.
(b) I follow a similar strategy to show that the characteristic function of log𝐴 is
non-vanishing. Notice that the density function of log𝐴 is given by 𝑓log𝐴(𝑥)=𝑓𝐴(𝑒𝑥)𝑒𝑥.






𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑓𝐴(𝑒𝑎)𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑎. It is easy to see that the characteristic function can be extended





(𝑖𝑎)𝑘𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑓𝐴(𝑒𝑎)𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑎,is well deﬁned and ﬁnite everywhere on the complex plane. There-
fore, 𝜑log𝐴 is an entire function. As before this implies that 𝜑𝑌 (𝑡) is non-vanishing.
Lemma 2
Let 𝑋 =( 𝑋1,𝑋 2) denote a vector of random variables such that
1. The support of X, 𝑆𝑋, is unbounded, i.e. 𝑆𝑋 =[ −∞,𝑀]2 for some 𝑀>0;
2. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(∣𝑋∣≥𝑥) ≤ 𝐿0𝑒−𝑥 for some 𝐿0 > 0.
27Then, provided that 𝑇𝑛 = 𝑂(( 𝑛
log 𝑛)𝗼) for some 𝗼>0:
(𝑎) 𝑠𝑢𝑝[−𝑇𝑛,𝑇 𝑛]∣
∫




Further, if the following conditions are satisﬁed
3. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(∣𝑋2∣≥𝑥) ≤ 𝐿1𝑒−𝑥 for some 𝐿1 > 0;
4. 𝐸[𝑋𝑘
1∣𝑋2] ≤ 𝐿𝑘 < ∞ for some 𝐿𝑘 > 0, 𝑘 =1 ,2;
5. 𝐸[𝑋𝑘
1∣𝑋2] ≤ 𝐿2 ∗ 𝐿𝑘−2
3 𝑘! < ∞ for some 𝐿3 > 0, 𝑘>2;
then, provided that 𝑇𝑛 = 𝑂(( 𝑛
log 𝑛)𝗼) for some 𝗼>0:
(𝑏) 𝑠𝑢𝑝[−𝑇𝑛,𝑇 𝑛]∣
∫



















for some 𝑀1,𝑀 2 > 0s u c ht h a t𝑛0 = 𝑛0(𝑀1,𝑀 2)=i n f {𝑛 : 𝑅𝑛 ≤ 1/4
√
max(𝑀1,𝑀 2)}
and 𝐾𝑛 =i n f{𝑥>0: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(∣𝑋∣ >𝑥 ) ≤ 𝑅𝑛}.
It is straightforward to verify that condition (5) is satisﬁed for 𝑅𝑛 =(
log𝑛
𝑛 )0.5 and 𝑇𝑛 =
𝑂(( 𝑛
log𝑛)𝗼)w i t h𝗼>0w h e n𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(∣𝑋∣≥𝑥) ≤ 𝐿0𝑒−𝑥 for some 𝐿0 > 0. The latter implies


































(log𝑛)2𝗼−1 < ∞ for 𝑀1 > 1a n d𝑀2 > 2(𝗼 +1 ) .
(b) The result in Csorgo (1980) can be extended to the case of
Δ𝑛(𝑇𝑛)=𝑠𝑢𝑝[−𝑇𝑛,𝑇 𝑛]∣
∫
𝑖𝑋1𝑒𝑖𝑡2𝑋2𝑑( ˆ 𝐹𝑛;𝑋 − 𝐹𝑋)∣
when random vector 𝑋 satisﬁes conditions (1-5). The statement exactly identical to the one
in Theorem 1 of Csorgo (1980) obtains with the only modiﬁcation that 𝑛0 = 𝑛0(𝑀1,𝑀 2)=




Let 𝑋1 =l o g ( 𝐵𝑖1 − 𝐵𝑖2)∣𝐵𝑖1 − 𝐵𝑖2 > 0 and 𝑋2 =l o g ( 𝐵𝑖3 − 𝐵𝑖4)∣𝐵𝑖3 − 𝐵𝑖4 > 0 for
some 𝑖1,...,𝑖4 such that 𝑖1 ∕= 𝑖2 and 𝑖3 ∕= 𝑖4. Then the the following properties hold:
1. The support of X, 𝑆𝑋, is unbounded, i.e. 𝑆𝑋 =[ −∞,𝑀 0]2 for some 𝑀0 > 0;
2. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(∣𝑋2∣≥𝑧) ≤ 𝐿0𝑒−𝑧 as 𝑧 →− ∞and for some 𝐿0 > 0.;
3. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(∣𝑋∣≥𝑧) ≤ 𝐿01𝑒𝑧 as 𝑧 →− ∞and for some 𝐿01 > 0.
4. 𝐸[𝑋𝑘
1∣𝑋2] ≤ 𝐿𝑘 < ∞ for some 𝐿𝑘 > 0, 𝑘 =1 ,2;
5. 𝐸[𝑋𝑘
1∣𝑋2] ≤ 𝐿2 ∗ 𝐿𝑘−2
3 𝑘! < ∞ for some 𝐿3 > 0, 𝑘>2.
Proof
1. According to the assumptions of the model 𝑆(𝐵𝑖𝑘)=[ 𝑏, 𝑏]. Then, 𝑆(Δ𝑘𝑙∣Δ𝑘𝑙 > 0) =
(0, 𝑏 − 𝑏]. Finally, 𝑆(𝐿Δ𝑘𝑙∣Δ𝑘𝑙 > 0) = (−∞, log(𝑏 − 𝑏)]. Denoting 𝑀0 =l o g ( 𝑏 − 𝑏)
obtains the result.
292. Here I use that log(𝐵𝑖𝑘)=l o g ( 𝐴𝑖𝑘)+l o g ( 𝑌2). Then,
Pr(log(𝐴𝑖𝑘−𝐴𝑖𝑙)+log𝑌2 ≤ 𝑧∣𝐴𝑖𝑘−𝐴𝑖𝑙 > 0) =
Pr(log(𝐴𝑖𝑘 − 𝐴𝑖𝑙)+l o g𝑌2 ≤ 𝑧, 𝐴𝑖𝑘 − 𝐴𝑖𝑙 > 0)
Pr(𝐴𝑖𝑘 − 𝐴𝑖𝑙 > 0)
.
Further,




























𝑓𝐴𝑘(𝑎1) 𝑑𝑎1 𝑓𝐿𝑌2(𝑦)𝑑𝑦 ≤ 𝑊1𝑒𝑧 + 𝑜(𝑒𝑧)
as 𝑧 →− ∞ .
The last inequality holds because 𝐴𝑘,𝐴 𝑙,𝐿 𝑌 2 have ﬁnite support and continuous den-











𝑓𝐴𝑘(𝑎1) 𝑑𝑎1 𝑓𝐿𝑌2(𝑦)𝑑𝑦 are bounded by some constant.








(1 − 𝐹𝐴𝑘(𝑎1))𝑓𝐴𝑙(𝑎1) 𝑑𝑎1 ≥ 𝑊2 for some 𝑊2 > 0. (6)
Combining (5) and (6) proves the result of the lemma.
303. Similarly,




























(𝐹𝐴1(𝑎1 + 𝑒𝑧1−𝑦) − 𝐹𝐴1(𝑎1))𝑓𝐴2(𝑎1)𝑑𝑎1
𝑎 ∫
𝑎


















𝑒𝑧1𝑒𝑧2𝑊4 for some 𝑊4 > 0a s𝑧1,𝑧 2 →− ∞ .
In addition,































(1 − 𝐹𝐴1(𝑎 + 𝑒𝑦))(1 − 𝐹𝐴2(𝑎 + 𝑒𝑦))𝑓𝐴3(𝑎)𝑑𝑎 > 𝑊6 > 0.
4. The probability density function of the conditional distribution of log(𝐵𝑖1 −𝐵𝑖2)c o n -





























































































The ﬁrst inequality holds for every 𝑏2 ∕= 𝑏, 𝑏 since due to absolute continuity of 𝑓𝐴 and
𝑓𝐿𝑌2 there exists non-empty sets of 𝑦’s and 𝑎2’s such that the integrand is positive over
these sets. The second inequality also arises due to the continuity of 𝑓𝐴 and 𝑓𝐿𝑌2 and
























1𝑒−𝑏1𝑑𝑏1)=𝑊8(𝑒𝑀(𝑀2 − 2(𝑀 − 1)).




































































for some 𝑊9 > 0.
Lemma 4
Let 𝑋 be a random variable with the probability density function 𝑓𝑋(.) and such that
1. The characteristic function of 𝑋, 𝜑𝑋(𝑡) is ordinarily smooth, i.e. ∣𝜑𝑋(𝑡)∣≥𝑑0∣𝑡∣−𝗽𝑥
for some 𝑑0 > 0 and 𝗽𝑥 > 1;
2. The estimator of 𝜑𝑋(𝑡), ˆ 𝜑𝑋;𝑛(𝑡) is such that 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑡∈[−𝑇𝑛,𝑇 𝑛]∣ˆ 𝜑𝑋;𝑛(𝑡) − 𝜑𝑋(𝑡)∣ = 𝐶𝜑;𝑛;







∣ ˆ 𝑓𝑛;𝑋(𝑥) − 𝑓𝑋(𝑥)∣≤2𝑇𝑛𝐶𝑛;𝜑 + 𝑇1−𝗽𝑥
𝑛 a.s.
Proof





























Proof of Theorem 2
Step 1
First,I begin by establishing that sup [−𝑇𝑛,𝑇 𝑛] ∣ˆ 𝜑𝑛;𝐿𝑌2(𝑡) − 𝜑𝐿𝑌2(𝑡)∣ = 𝑂((
log 𝑛
𝑛 )0.5).
In Step 1 I always condition on Δ1,2𝐵>0, Δ3,4𝐵>0. I suppress conditioning in the
notations for the ease of exposition.
Applying Taylor approximation to































Ψ𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵(0,𝑢2) 𝑑𝑢2)∣.T h e n










𝑑𝑘𝑇(𝐹𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵; ˆ 𝐹𝑛;𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵 − 𝐹𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵),






𝑖𝑏1𝑒𝑖𝑢2𝑏2𝑑(𝐹𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵 + 𝜆( ˆ 𝐹𝑛;𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵 − 𝐹𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵))
∫
𝑒𝑖𝑢2𝑏2𝑑(𝐹𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵 + 𝜆( ˆ 𝐹𝑛;𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵 − 𝐹𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵))
𝑑𝑢2∣𝜆=0.
35By direct diﬀerentiation I establish that















𝑒𝑖𝑢2𝑏2𝑑( ˆ 𝐹𝑛;𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵 − 𝐹𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵).
𝐵(𝑢2)=
∫
𝑒𝑖𝑢2𝑏2𝑑( ˆ 𝐹𝑛;𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵 − 𝐹𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵).
Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 imply that
sup
𝑡∈[−𝑇𝑛,𝑇𝑛]








)0.5 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑛 =(
log𝑛
𝑛









)0.5 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑛 =(
log𝑛
𝑛














𝑒𝑖𝑢2𝑏2𝑑( ˆ 𝐹𝑛;𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵 − 𝐹𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵)∣≤
∣
∫





𝑒𝑖𝑢2𝑏2𝑑( ˆ 𝐹𝑛;𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵 − 𝐹𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵)∣ = 𝑂(𝑅𝑛).
36Next,





















𝑛 for some 𝑄1,𝑄 2 > 0.
The following reasoning justiﬁes the inequality: 𝜑𝐿𝑌2(𝑡)a n d𝜑𝐿Δ𝑘,𝑙𝐴(𝑡) are ordinarily
smooth with parameters 𝗽𝐿𝑌2 and 𝗽𝐿Δ𝐴 respectively. Since 𝐿Δ𝑘,𝑙𝐵 = 𝐿𝑌2 + 𝐿Δ𝑘,𝑙𝐴
then Ψ𝐿Δ1,2𝐵,𝐿Δ3,4𝐵(0,𝑢 2) is ordinarily smooth with parameter 𝗽𝐿Δ𝐵 = 𝗽𝐿𝑌2 + 𝗽𝐿Δ𝐴.
Further,it can be shown (see Li and Voung (1998)) that if 𝑇𝑛 is large enough then









































Next,Lemma 4 implies that
sup
𝑦∈𝑆𝐿𝑌2
















2 > 0a n d𝑦2 < ∞:
sup
𝑦∈𝑆𝑌2
∣ ˆ 𝑓𝑌2(𝑦) − 𝑓𝑌2(𝑦)∣ =s u p
𝑦∈𝑆𝑌2
∣










Iu s e𝐶𝑓𝑌2 to denote sup𝑦∈𝑆𝑌2 ∣ ˆ 𝑓𝑌2(𝑦) − 𝑓𝑌2(𝑦)∣ in the rest of the proof.
Step 2
All the analysis below is performed conditional on Δ1,3𝐴, Δ2,3𝐴 unless otherwise
noted. The conditioning is suppressed for the ease of exposition. I begin by deriving
sup
[−𝑇𝑛,𝑇 𝑛]
∣ˆ 𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2) − 𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2)∣.
Taylor expansion gives:





(log(ˆ 𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2)) − log(𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2)))𝑘.
Further,
∣ˆ 𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2) − 𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2)∣≤
𝑘=∞ ∑
𝑘=1
∣(log(ˆ 𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2)) − log(𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2))∣𝑘 =
𝑂(log(ˆ 𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2)) − log(𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2)))
when ∣log(ˆ 𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2)) − log(𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2))∣ < 1.
Then,
∣log(ˆ 𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2)) − log(𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2))∣ =
∣log(ˆ Ψ𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2)) − log(Ψ𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴(𝑡1,𝑡 2)) +
log(ˆ 𝜑𝐿𝑌2(𝑡1 + 𝑡2)) − log(𝜑𝐿𝑌2(𝑡1 + 𝑡2))∣≤
𝑂(∣




∣ˆ 𝜑𝐿𝑌2(𝑡1 + 𝑡2) − 𝜑𝐿𝑌2(𝑡1 + 𝑡2)∣
𝜑𝐿𝑌2(𝑡1 + 𝑡2)
).
38Similar to Step 1,ordinary smoothness of 𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴 and of 𝜑𝐿𝑌2 implies that




Applying Lemma 2 and Lemma 3,I obtain
sup
𝑡1,𝑡2∈[−𝑇𝑛,𝑇𝑛]2














if 𝑇𝑛 = 𝑂(
𝑛
log𝑛
)𝗼, with 𝗼 ≤
1
2𝗽∗ where
𝗽∗ =m i n {(𝗽𝐿Δ1,3𝐵 + 𝗽𝐿Δ2,3𝐵), (1 + 2𝗽𝐿Δ𝐵3,4 + 𝗽𝐿𝑌2)}.
Notice that in above (𝑡1 + 𝑡2) ∈ [−2𝑇𝑛,2𝑇𝑛]w h e r ea s2 𝑇𝑛 is still 𝑂(( 𝑛
log 𝑛)𝗼).
Using Lemma 4 and the fact that 𝜑𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴 is ordinarily smooth with param-
eters 𝗽𝐿Δ𝐴1,3,𝗽 𝐿Δ𝐴2,3 obtains:
sup
𝑎1,𝑎 2∈𝑆(𝐿Δ1,3𝐴,𝐿Δ2,3𝐴)






















2(𝗽∗ + 𝗽𝐿Δ1,3𝐴 + 𝗽𝐿Δ2,3𝐴 − 1)
.
Also,for every subset, 𝑆𝐶 =[ 𝜀𝑛,𝑀 𝐴]2,of 𝑆(Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴)=( 0 ,𝑀 𝐴]2
sup
[𝜀𝑛,𝑀𝐴]2
∣ ˆ 𝑓Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴(𝑎1,𝑎 2) − 𝑓Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴(𝑎1,𝑎 2)∣ =
sup
[𝜀𝑛,𝑀𝐴]2
















)𝗾 for some 𝗾>0.
Next,I investigate the convergence of the estimator for the density of the uncondi-
tional distribution of Δ1,2𝐴, Δ3,4𝐴.
sup
𝑎1,𝑎 2∈𝑆(Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴)




It is so because
∣ ˆ Pr(Δ1,3𝐵> < 0, Δ2,3𝐵> < 0) − Pr(Δ1,3𝐵> < 0, Δ2,3𝐵> < 0)∣ = 𝑂(𝑛
1
2).
Next,I use the uniform convergence of ˆ 𝑓Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴(𝑎1,𝑎 2) to show the uniform
convergence for ˆ 𝜑𝐴𝑖3,ˆ 𝜑𝐴𝑖𝑘 as well as ˆ 𝑓𝐴𝑖3 and ˆ 𝑓𝐴𝑖𝑘 for 𝑘 =1 ,2. I begin as in Step 1 by
using a Taylor approximation to obtain that















𝑒𝑖(𝑢1𝑎1+𝑢2𝑎2) ˆ 𝑓Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴(𝑎1,𝑎 2)𝑑𝑎1𝑑𝑎2
ˆ Ψ1;Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴(𝑢1,𝑢 2)=
∫
𝑖𝑎1𝑒𝑖(𝑢1𝑎1+𝑢2𝑎2) ˆ 𝑓Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴(𝑎1,𝑎 2)𝑑𝑎1𝑑𝑎2.






𝑑𝑘𝑇(𝑓Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴; ˆ 𝑓𝑛;Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴 − 𝑓Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴),
40where






𝑎1𝑒𝑖𝑢2𝑎2(𝑓Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴 + 𝜆( ˆ 𝑓𝑛;Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴 − 𝑓Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴))𝑑𝑎1𝑑𝑎2
∫
















𝑒𝑖𝑢2𝑎2𝑑( ˆ 𝑓𝑛;Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴 − 𝑓Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴)𝑑𝑎1𝑑𝑎2.
𝐵(𝑢2)=
∫
𝑒𝑖𝑢2𝑎2( ˆ 𝑓𝑛;Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴 − 𝑓Δ1,3𝐴,Δ2,3𝐴)𝑑𝑎1𝑑𝑎2.
In contrast to Step 1 all the random variables in the expression above have bounded
support. Therefore,
∣𝐵(𝑢2)∣≤(Δ𝑎)2𝐶𝑓Δ𝐴
∣𝐴(𝑢2)∣≤(𝑎2 − 𝑎2)(Δ𝑎 +Δ 𝑎2)𝑂(𝐶𝑓Δ𝐴).
















where ˜ 𝑇𝑛 = 𝑂((
𝑛
log𝑛
)𝗼1)f o rs o m e𝗼1 > 0.
Therefore,





0.5 − 𝗼(1 + 𝗽∗) − 2𝗾
2𝗽Δ𝐴
.
41The rate of convergence for 𝐴𝑖1 and 𝐴𝑖2 is obtained as at the beginning of Step 2.






















))f o r𝑘 =1 ,2.
Finally,the rate of convergence for densities follows from Lemma 4 and is given by







𝑛 for 𝑘 =1 ,2,3













0.5 − 𝗼(1 + 𝗽∗) − 2𝗾
𝗽Δ𝐴 +2 𝗽𝐴𝑖3
<𝗼 1 <
0.5 − 𝗼(1 + 𝗽∗) − 2𝗾
2𝗽Δ𝐴


















0.5 − 𝗼(1 + 𝗽∗) − 2𝗾
2𝗽Δ𝐴 + 𝗽𝐴𝑖3 + 𝗽𝐴𝑖𝑘 − 1
<𝗼 1 <
0.5 − 𝗼(1 + 𝗽∗) − 2𝗾
2𝗽Δ𝐴
.
The uniform consistency of the estimator for the density of cost distribution is shown
exactly like in Krasnokutskaya (2009). The only modiﬁcation needed concerns the derivation
of the estimators for the support bounds. More speciﬁcally,if [Δ 𝑎, Δ𝑎] denotes the support













Alternatively,I could have used restriction that Δ𝑎 = −Δ𝑎 since it holds even under the
normalization above. The last two equations uniquely identify 𝑦
2 and 𝑦2 whereas the ﬁrst
42two equation will then identify Δ𝑎 and Δ𝑎 consistent with 𝐸[log𝑌2] = 1 normalization.
The latter set of values can be used to identify 𝑎 and 𝑎 from the following restrictions:




This set of restrictions is used to derive estimators for the support bounds.
Step 3
Iﬁ r s td e r i v e
𝐶𝑓𝑌2𝐴1 =s u p
𝑧∈𝑆(𝑌2𝐴1)




∣ ˆ 𝑓𝑌2(𝑦) ˆ 𝑓𝐴𝑖1(
𝑧
𝑦






































))f o rs o m e𝑄3 > 0.
Here
∫ 1
𝑦𝑑𝑦 ≤ 𝑀0,𝑌2, ∣ ˆ 𝑓𝑌2(𝑦)∣≤𝑀1,𝑌2, ∣𝑓𝐴𝑖1(𝑧
𝑦)∣≤𝑀1,𝐴1 with 𝑀0,𝑌2 > 0,𝑀 1,𝑌2 >
0 𝑀1,𝐴1 > 0.
This,then,implies that
∣ˆ 𝜑𝑌2𝐴𝑖1(𝑡) − 𝜑𝑌2𝐴𝑖1(𝑡)∣≤
∫











Similar to Step 2:
∣ˆ 𝜑𝑌1(𝑡) − 𝜑𝑌1(𝑡)∣ = 𝑂(∣log(ˆ 𝜑𝑌1(𝑡)) − log(𝜑𝑌1(𝑡))∣
43and
𝐶𝜑𝑌1 =s u p
𝑡∈[−𝑇𝑛,𝑇𝑛]
∣log(ˆ 𝜑𝑌1(𝑡)) − log(𝜑𝑌1(𝑡))∣≤𝑂(∣




ˆ 𝜑𝑌2𝐴𝑖1(𝑡) − 𝜑𝑌2𝐴𝑖1(𝑡)
𝜑𝑌2𝐴𝑖1(𝑡)




















if 𝗽𝑌2𝐴1 < 1+𝗽𝐵, or 𝗼2 ≤
𝗼(1 + 𝗽∗)+2 𝗾 + 𝗼1(2𝗽Δ𝐴 + 𝗽𝐴𝑖3)
1+𝗽𝐵 + 𝗽𝑌2𝐴1
.
Here I use the ordinary smoothness of Ψ𝐵𝑖1(𝑡)a n d𝜑𝑌2𝐴𝑖1(𝑡).
The value for sup𝑡∈[−𝑇𝑛,𝑇𝑛] ∣ˆ Ψ𝐵𝑖1(𝑡) − Ψ𝐵𝑖1(𝑡)∣ is obtained from integration by parts
sup
𝑡∈[− ˆ 𝑇𝑛, ˆ 𝑇𝑛]
∣ˆ Ψ𝐵𝑖1(𝑡) − Ψ𝐵𝑖1(𝑡)∣ = ∣
∫
( ˆ 𝐹𝑛;𝐵(𝑏) − 𝐹𝑛;𝐵(𝑏))𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑑𝑏∣ =




for ˆ 𝑇𝑛 = 𝑂((
𝑛
log𝑛
)𝗼2)w i t h𝗼2 > 0.
The value for 𝐶𝐹𝐵 obtains by the log-log law (see Chung,1949; Serﬁng,1980). Finally,
from Lemma 4 I have
∣ ˆ 𝑓𝑌1(𝑡) − 𝑓𝑌1(𝑡)∣≤2𝐶𝜑𝑌1
ˆ 𝑇𝑛 + 𝑑𝑌1 ˆ 𝑇𝑛
1−𝗽𝑌1 =
𝑂((
log𝑛
𝑛
)
0.5−𝗼(1+𝗽∗)−2𝗾−𝗼1(2𝗽Δ𝐴+𝗽𝐴𝑖3
)−𝗼2(1+𝗽𝑌2𝐴1))+𝑂((
log𝑛
𝑛
)𝗼2(𝗽𝑌1−1)).
44